This contribution seeks to carve out a notion of ‘political judgment’ that is based both on Dewey’s and Kant’s theories of judgment.

 My aim here is threefold. First, I highlight the similarities between Dewey and Kant, despite Dewey’s rather negative view of Kant in other contexts. Second, my account deviates from the standard Kantian account of political judgment delivered by Hannah Arendt, as both Kant and Dewey are taken to offer a view that we should understand political judgments as being both reflective and determinant, for which it is suggested that we use the overriding notion of *interpretive judgments*. Third, such an understanding could give an alternative meaning to the idea of “epistemic democracy”, an idea which centers around the notion that “democracy tracks the truth”, a metaphor that goes to the heart of what epistemic democrats hold (this includes pragmatist thinkers like Cheryl Misak, Robert Talisse and others). However, speaking of truth in connection with political discourse seems misleading, as judgments and not propositions are the relevant epistemic ‘entities’ of political discourses. Hence, if we want to insist that political discourses have a cognitive dimension and are not only the expression of pure will or emotion, we need to know just how political judgments are cognitive. I believe that the notion of political judgments as interpretive judgments is a good start for a search to an answer to this question.

In Dewey (mainly in his *Logic* and in *Art as Experience*) we find a theory of judging that resonates Kant’s understanding of judgments. Both emphasize that the process of reaching a judgment in inquiry follows the pattern of juridical procedures, and both present judging as an act of creativity.

Bearing in mind the Kantian distinction between determinant and reflective judgment, it seems that moral, legal or scientific judgments are in an important sense different from aesthetic and political judgments, as the former kind of judgments can rely on universals, while the latter cannot. This is not true, however. While it might seem as that the legal meaning of judging only refers to the act of subsuming the specific under the universal in the sense that the universal as the law is already given, the practice of casuistic legal judging as a case-based reasoning in case law or precedent is in part a practice that works its way up from the specific to the universal. In such judgments determinant and reflective judgments *intersect*.

The structural feature of reflective judgments is that they *coordinate* a particular form with an idea of an overall sense of order, and such coordination is an *interpretive* mode of cognitive judgment. In other words, it is this coordination of particularity and universality that makes the reflective judgment interpretive. The aesthetic reflective parts of political judgments indeed are marked by disinterestedness and a community-orientation (in the Arendtian sense), but in political judgments we also find impartial considerations about means and ends as well as determinant practical judgments, both of which need not to be necessarily impartial, but in turn are shaped by the experiences that a culture (in the Deweyan sense of his cultural naturalism) offers.

Hence, the cognitive ‘content’ of political judgments lies in their functionality as coordinative-interpretive activities. It is in this sense (and this sense only) that we might speak of a cognitive or epistemic dimension of political deliberation that can never be neatly separated from the aesthetical and cultural dimensions of judging.